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1. Introduction 
 
Countries in a monetary union can adjust to shocks either through internal or external mechanisms. In 
this study we try to provide some measure of the size of selected external adjustment mechanisms 
area theory in the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
compared to those in the United States (US). We do so by updating a number of empirical analyses in 
the economic literature that identify (1) the size of asymmetries across countries or states and (2) the 
magnitude of insurance mechanisms in the EMU relative to similar mechanisms in the US, one of the 
most-studied currency unions. We also study how these mechanisms have changed over time. 
 
When a country or state suffers an adverse economic shock, it enters a phase of adjustment towards 
equilibrium. Several mechanisms can play a role in mitigating idiosyncratic shocks: exchange rate 
adjustment, monetary policy, price and wage adjustment, labour mobility, saving and borrowing, 
diversified portfolio with external assets, and direct insurance. Some of these channels are available to 
countries in a monetary union; the first two, however, are not. 
 
A first channel for adjustment that countries lose control of when entering a currency union is the 
exchange rate. A lower exchange rate effectively reduces wages and prices in comparison to trade 
partners, which contributes to restoring employment. In addition, currency depreciation reduces the 
burden of international debt, which is denominated in domestic currency. In this way, some of the 
debt.  
 
A country-specific monetary policy constitutes a second channel through which idiosyncratic shocks 
can be cushioned. When a country is hit by an adverse economic shock, its central bank can respond 
by lowering interest rates and if necessary resort to non-standard monetary policy tools as we have 
seen in the recent financial crisis. In this way, monetary policy aims to lower interest rates in financial 
markets as well as the loan rates set by banks, which stimulates economic activity. 
 
By entering into a currency union, a country gives up both the exchange rate and the country-specific 
monetary policy as adjustment mechanisms. Therefore, these channels can no longer cushion 
idiosyncratic shocks.
1
 This means that joining a monetary union may be costly because a larger 
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 To be sure, there are significant benefits of entering into a currency union that may well offset those costs. These include 
a reduction in trade barriers due to transaction costs, as well as a commitment to lower inflation. As e.g. Alesina and Barro 
(2002) point out, joining a currency union includes disciplining oneself to keep inflation in check, and hence lowers the 
price of credit. These benefits are not the focus of this study. Also, the extent to which exchange rate changes are effective 
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burden of recovery falls on the other adjustment mechanisms that may be less effective in mitigating 
shocks. One class of mechanisms is that of internal adjustment mechanisms, where countries reduce 
real wages compared to trade partners in order to regain competitiveness. This often coincides with 
prolonged periods of high unemployment. Another way of coping with shocks is by relying on external 
mechanisms.
2
 If such channels of explicit or implicit risk sharing among countries are strong, giving up 
some monetary independence will be less costly. 
 
Which external channels are available, and how relevant are they for determining the costs of joining 
the monetary union? The economic theory of optimal currency areas has identified several factors that 
determine the costs for union members of giving up their own currency. The literature starts with the 
seminal contribution by Mundell (1961), who addressed the question whether it is optimal that 
boundaries in currency areas typically coincide with national boundaries. A literature since Mundell 
has subsequently identified a number of criteria that affect the costs of sharing a single currency (see 
e.g. Krugman, 2012, for a recent summary). In this study, we quantitatively assess a number of the 
external channels of risk sharing among countries suggested by Mundell for the EU as well as for the 
US and compare them. 
 
A first relevant factor is the extent to which the currency union partners experience a more or less 
economies develop in a symmetric way. When all countries in a monetary union are hit by a shock in 
the same way at the same time, the same monetary policy response will be suitable for each member 
of the union. In effect, similarity implies that joining a monetary union does not pose many restrictions 
ssibilities after a shock. To study the level of synchronisation among EMU 
countries we apply a methodology as in Alesina et al (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007). 
 
A second factor is how mobile labour and capital are across borders. Adjustment of labour markets in 
response to macroeconomic shocks is easier when the labour force can move to neighbouring 
countries. A sudden local increase in unemployment will induce labourers to move to other countries, 
while a local shortage of labourers will attract foreign workers. These migration effects will reduce the 
need to regain full employment through an (often lengthier) process of real wage adjustment, and 
associated longer periods of large unemployment. To measure the effect of an employment shock on 
                                                                                                                                                        
instruments to create the flexible relative prices that are necessary to meet output shocks has been nuanced, e.g. in 
Dornbusch (2001). 
2
 In practice, internal and external adjustment mechanisms are substitutes in the sense that a greater amount of internal 
adjustment reduces the need for external adjustment. 
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employment levels, unemployment rates and participation rates, we follow the methodology used in 
Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas (1995). 
 
A third factor relates to the extent to which countries can insure against economic shocks by 
diversifying themselves financially. If part of the assets in a country is held by foreign investors, 
economic shocks are borne partly by these investors, and only partly impact upon the host country. 
And similarly, if a country has a geographically diverse portfolio of assets, shocks are diversified as 
well. In addition, financial integration also contributes to the smoothing of consumption shocks. If 
countries have access to external capital markets and banks, saving and borrowing helps in reducing 
the responsiveness of consumption to output shocks. To study the amount of risk sharing by the 
different channels, we follow the empirical framework of Asdrubali et al (1996) and Afonso and Furceri 
(2007). 
 
Finally, part of the burden of an economic shock can be shared through transfers among the countries. 
In a fiscal union, such as the US, the transfers between a state and the federal government will often 
depend on the position in the economic cycle the state is in. Such transfers involve both taxes towards 
the federal level, and contributions from the federal level to the state, for example social security 
payments. Wolff (2012) discusses in detail the possibilities in constructing a European budget. An 
additional transfer channel that has shown its importance in the financial crisis is that of financial 
assistance to banks. If other members of a currency union contribute to the bail-out of banks, or to the 
funding of deposit insurance, the flows involved could be sizable. To quantify this channel, we perform 
a very rudimentary study of risk sharing through a common safety net for banks as implied by the 
Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD). Here, we necessarily neglect many features. Note, for 
example, that part of the burden of banking crises may be shared through integrated capital markets if 
foreign private financiers of banks share in the cost of banking failures. 
 
Several disclaimers are in order. We will not address the issue whether current cross-border insurance 
mechanisms are too small, or too big, or just right. Also, we will not study why current mechanisms 
function the way they do, nor how policy could effectuate changes in these mechanisms. In order to 
address what optimal insurance mechanisms would look like, one would need to evaluate the costs 
and benefits of such mechanisms more closely. One crucial factor is of course how costly internal 
insurance mechanisms are, such as internal depreciation through a reduction in real wages. Other 
issues may involve how cross-border insurance may affect behaviour (moral hazard), and how averse 
countries are towards consumption uncertainty. 
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2. Co-movement of GDP, inflation and consumption 
 
The need for insurance mechanisms across countries in a currency union is greater when the shocks 
to their economies are less correlated. When economic variables of countries within a currency union 
move more or less in sync, the costs of a common monetary policy are lower, because the optimal 
monetary policy response for these countries would also be similar. In that case a one-size-fits-all 
monetary policy has no great costs.  
 
Problems may arise when business cycles within the various economies are not fully correlated, so 
that different economies would ideally have different monetary policies. If a particular economy in a 
currency union faces an idiosyncratic economic downturn, it cannot boost its economy by lowering 
relative wage costs through inflation or a devaluation of its currency. Instead, to regain equilibrium, 
real wages have to fall by other means. That, however, appears often easier said than done. 
 
The costs of giving up individual monetary policy are therefore lower when economic variables such as 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth and inflation exhibit greater co-movement. In the run-up to the 
introduction of the euro, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) compared co-movement of GDP growth and 
inflation among euro-area countries with those among US states. They noted a discrepancy between 
the core euro-area countries, and countries in the periphery. For the core, synchronisation of economic 
development was comparable to that among US states. For periphery countries, they found much more 
divergence. 
 
Since Bayoumi and Eichengreen, many studies have reinvestigated the level of synchronisation 
among EMU countries. De Haan et al (2008) survey the literature. One observation from that literature 
is that the period of study matters: there have been both periods of convergence and of divergence. 
Since the nineteen-nineties, however, business-cycle synchronisation increased. As Imbs (2004) 
shows, such synchronisation is partly driven by similarity of industrial sectors among countries, and 
by financial linkages. Increased trade among countries is also in part responsible for correlation of 
business cycles. This trade effect is particularly strong for trade of intermediate goods within 
industries (di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010).  
 
As Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) emphasise, what matters for determining the costs of joining a 
union is how similar countries are after they have entered into the currency union. 
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Barro and Tenreyro (2007) try to estimate the effect of joining a currency union on the level of 
similarity of shocks across many currency unions, using a methodology of Alesina et al (2002). They 
look at almost all countries in the world in the period 1960-1997 and find that the effect of joining a 
currency union is negative: overall, countries that have joined a currency union experience a 
somewhat reduced synchronicity in their economic output. They conjecture that this might reflect a 
mechanism put forward by Krugman (1993): countries within a currency union might gain by 
specialising into different sectors of the economy. This specialisation would expose them to different 
economic shocks.  
 
Here we use the methodology of Alesina et al (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007) to study how co-
movement of output, inflation and consumption among euro-area countries has changed since the 
introduction of the euro. We estimate the co-movements of GDP, price levels and consumption 
between countries in the EMU and between states in the US over the period 1987-2012, and ask 
whether the distribution of outcomes for the two regions is markedly different. In particular, we study 
whether the introduction of the euro influenced the extent of co-movements of GDP between the 
-movement over the same 
period.  
 
2.1 Methodology 
 
In line with Alesina et al (2002) and Barro and Tenreyro (2007), we compute for every pair of countries 
( ) the second-order autoregression 
 
 (1) 
 
where  denotes GDP for country  and  denotes GDP for country  in year . The estimated 
residual, , measures the relative GDP that could not be explained by the two lags of relative GDP. 
The extent of GDP co-movement in a certain time period is measured by the root-mean-square error: 
  (2) 
The interpretation of this measure of co-movement is that a lower  indicates greater correlation of 
GDP movements between two countries  and .  
6
 The extent of co-movement of prices and the extent of co-movement of consumption are both 
calculated using the same method, by replacing  with respectively  and . Denoting the 
residuals that measure the unpredictable movements in relative prices by , and the residuals that 
measure the relative consumption that could not be explained by the two prior values of relative 
consumption by , we define the measure of the extent of co-movement for prices as 
 (3) 
and for consumption as 
 (4). 
 
Importantly, the lower , the greater the co-movement of prices between countries  and . 
Similarly, the lower , the greater the co-movement of consumption between countries  and . 
 
2.2 Data 
 
Data on 
Development Indicators (WDI) and is in some cases complemented with data from the OECD. 
Combining both sources, we generate a panel of 12 EMU countries
3
 with yearly data on GDP, prices and 
consumption for the period 1960-2012 (or shorter periods for prices and consumption). The panel for 
the US is composed of yearly data on GDP, prices and consumption from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and covers the period 1987-2012. 
 
As a measure of prices in the euro-area countries, we follow the literature by using the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) conversion factor for private consumption divided by the US dollar exchange rate, 
which measures how many dollars buy one dollar worth of goods in the domestic country as compared 
to the US. As a measure of prices in US states, we use the GDP deflator, which measures the cost of 
goods produced in a state relative to the purchasing power of the dollar. 
 
As an indicator for consumption we use real consumption per capita in 1995 euros for the EMU panel. 
This is household final consumption (formerly private consumption), which is the market value of all 
                                                 
3
 Consisting of the twelve European countries that adopted the euro as their national currency on January 1, 2002. 
7
goods and services purchased by households, including durable products and excluding purchases of 
dwelling. The US lacks data on real consumption per capita on state level. However, we do have data on 
personal consumption expenditures on the national level and on personal income on both national 
and state level. This allows us to approximate the consumption at the state level. By multiplying 
personal income per state with the ratio of personal consumption expenditures to personal income at 
the national level we construct estimates of the personal consumption expenditures per state. 
Furthermore we correct for inflation and population size to obtain a variable on real consumption per 
capita in 1995 dollars per state. Table 2.1 on the next page shows some descriptive statistics of the 
data used. 
 
8
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
Country Average PPP 
conversion factor / US 
dollar exchange rate 
Average Real GDP per 
capita 
Average Real 
consumption per capita 
  1980-2001 2002-2012  1960-2001 2002-2012  1970-2001 2002-2011 
Austria 0,98 0,88 18028 30664 11938 16536 
Belgium 0,97 0,91 18145 29167 11096 15098 
Finland 1,07 1,04 17032 30409 10209 15828 
France 1,02 0,92 17995 27279 11513 15635 
Germany 1,02 0,88 17936 28197 12089 16115 
Greece 0,43 0,76 10515 17118 7726 12219 
Ireland 0,91 1,04 14940 38263 9351 17826 
Italy 0,73 0,88 15947 24120 10558 14386 
Luxembourg 0,93 0,96 31414 65005 16611 23130 
Netherlands 0,97 0,89 19739 32294 11390 15278 
Portugal 0,53 0,73 8331 14722 6281 9587 
Spain 0,65 0,78 12030 20808 7974 11944 
EMU  0,85 0,89 16291 25909 10665 14719 
US 0,79 1,05 28688 35305 22958 29601 
Source: Bruegel, WDI. 
 
2.3 Results 
 
We first consider the overall distribution of co-movements in real GDP per capita,  of pairs of 
countries within the EMU, and compare this distribution with that of co-movements of pairs of states 
within the US
4
. We have 78 country pairs (66 country pairs and 12 pairs of each country with the EMU 
average) for the EMU and 1378 state pairs (1326 state pairs and 52 pairs of each state with the US 
average) for the US. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of co-movement of real GDP per capita among country pairs in the 
EMU and states in the US for the period after the introduction of the euro, that is, from 2002 until 2012. 
Recall that when two countries have a low , their GDPs evolve relatively synchronous. 
 
                                                 
4
 We compare the period 1960-2012 in the EMU with the period 1987-2012 in the US. 
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of co-movement of real GDP per capita among country pairs in the EMU and 
states in the US for the period 2002-2012 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
Fr
ac
tio
n
0-0
.00
5
0.0
05
-0.
01
0.0
1-0
.01
5
0.0
15
-0.
02
0.0
2-0
.02
5
0.0
25
-0.
03
0.0
3-0
.03
5
0.0
35
-0.
04
0.0
4-0
.04
5
0.0
45
-0.
05
0.0
5-0
.05
5
0.0
55
-0.
06
0.0
6-0
.06
5
0.0
65
-0.
07
VY Euro VY US
 
Source: Bruegel, World bank and Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note: the lower VY, the higher synchronicity. 
 
Given the distributions, real GDP per capita co-movements are roughly similar between the two regions 
for this period, even though the EMU has a higher fraction of observations on the left-hand side of the 
distribution, which results in a lower average VY of 0.018 compared to 0.022 in the US. The results 
suggest that synchronisation of real GDP per capita was slightly higher among EMU member states 
than among states in the US during the last decade (recall that a low value corresponds to high co-
movement). The t-value of the differences in means is equal to -3.42, which means the difference 
between the EMU and the US is significant at the 1 percent level.  
Let us next consider the evolution of co-movement in real GDP per capita over time. Table 0.1 in the 
Appendix displays the extent of co-movement of the individual countries with the average of the EMU 
before and after the introduction of the euro. Focusing on the left side of the table, the synchronisation 
of real GDP per capita, the degree of synchronisation has increased for all countries after the 
introduction of the euro, except for Germany and Greece. Luxembourg and Portugal experienced the 
largest average increase in synchronisation with the other euro-area countries. Furthermore, the 
country with the highest degree of synchronisation after the introduction of the euro is Greece, 
followed by, to a lesser extent, Ireland, Finland and Luxembourg. 
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Even though we find more co-movement in real GDP per capita after the introduction of the euro, this 
should not necessarily be attributed to joining the monetary union. As Gali et al (2013) note, a 
convergence in many economic indicators has occurred more widely in OECD countries, not only for 
those in the EMU.  
 
To address this issue, we compare the change in the synchronisation of real GDP per capita before 
2002 and after 2002 in EMU countries with the change in synchronisation in the period in the US. Thus, 
for each state or country we take the difference between the levels of co-movement for the period 
before 2002 and after 2002 (we call this co-movement). For each state or country this measures the 
change in synchronisation before and after the introduction of the euro. In the EMU, 10 out of 12 
countries experienced an increase in co-movement since 2002, while in the US the extent of 
synchronisation increased for 30 out of 51 states during the same time period.  
 
Next, we order the difference from small to large and plot them on a scale from zero to one. This gives 
an approximation of the empirical cumulative density distribution for the delta in co-movement. For US 
states we have 51 draws from this distribution, for EMU countries there are 12 draws. The results in 
Figure 2.2 show that the line for the EMU is shifted to the left, which shows that EMU countries 
experienced a larger increase in synchronisation than US states in that period. Whereas only 20 
percent of US states experience a decrease of 40 percent or more in VY, roughly 50 percent of EMU 
experienced such a decrease. This rudimentary difference-in-difference analysis suggests that the 
introduction of the euro has played a role in the increase of the degree of synchronisation among the 
EMU countries. 
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative density distribution of the change in GDP synchronisation before and after 
introduction of the euro 
 
Source: Bruegel based on World bank and Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Although the co-movement of real GDP per capita since the introduction of the euro has increased, the 
financial crisis may also have affected synchronisation among countries. It is possible that countries 
have become more asymmetric due to the global shock because of country-specific differences in the 
terms of trade and fiscal imbalances. On the other hand, countries may have become more 
synchronised because all countries have ended up in a recession at the same time (Gaechter et al, 
2012).  
 
Although the time-series are rather short, the graph on the left in Figure 2.3 shows the difference in co-
movement between the period before the introduction of the euro and the period 2002-2007, the 
years before the beginning of the crisis. With a t-value of 3.93 the difference in means between the 
before euro period and the 2002-2007 period is significant at the 1 percent level.  
The graph on the right, on the other hand, includes the crisis years. It is clear that the synchronisation 
among euro-area countries has decreased since the start of the crisis. The difference in means 
between the before euro period and the 2002-2012 period is not statistically significant anymore (t-
value of 1.48). This is in line with the finding of Gali (2013) of strong convergence in economic 
indicators in the first years of the EMU, but an interruption of the convergence progress among EMU 
countries after the onset of the financial crisis. Nevertheless, synchronisation is still larger than before 
the introduction of the euro.  
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Figure 2.3: Co-movement in real GDP per capita of individual euro-area countries with average EMU 
before and after the introduction of the euro, for the period until the financial crisis (lhs) and 
including the financial crisis (rhs) 
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Source: Bruegel, World bank and Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note: the lower VY, the higher synchronicity. 
 
Asymmetries in GDP are relatively similar for the US and the EMU. If we look at price levels, we see a 
different picture. The bars on the left-hand side of the figure below are higher for the US than for the 
EMU, while the EMU has more observations at higher levels of asymmetry. This implies more 
synchronisation of prices among states in the US than among euro-area countries. The difference in 
sample means for the EMU and the US has a t-statistic of 2.27, so the difference is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of co-movement of price levels among country pairs in the EMU and states 
in the US for the period 2002-2012 
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Source: Bruegel, World bank and Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Note: the lower VP, the higher synchronicity. 
 
Looking at the underlying data, we see that the larger number of observations at higher levels for the 
EMU are driven in particular by a small number of countries whose inflation rates have had markedly 
different dynamics from those of the rest of the EMU countries. These countries include Spain, Greece 
and Portugal, which had considerably lower than average price levels, and Finland and France, which 
had much higher than average price levels. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
We find that co-movement of real GDP per capita among EMU countries in the period 2002-2012 is on 
average slightly stronger than that among US states. We also find that, on the whole, co-movement for 
individual countries was greater in the first years after the introduction of the euro, but has decreased 
again after the beginning of the crisis. 
 
Co-movement of inflation in the EMU countries is a different story, however. Here we see a larger 
dispersion among countries than is the case among states in the US. In particular, inflation in periphery 
countries such as Greece and Ireland correlates less with the other EMU countries. This reflects 
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continued higher inflation at the beginning of the century as these countries experienced strong 
growth and the subsequent problems that emerged with the crisis (see e.g. Gali et al, 2013). 
 
A priori, more co-movement in real GDP per capita after the introduction of the euro should not 
necessarily be attributed to that event. As Gali et al (2013) note, a convergence in many economic 
indicators has occurred more widely in OECD countries. This period of low macroeconomic volatility in 
the developed world was termed Great Moderation (see e.g. CPB, 2009). When comparing the 
convergence among US states with the convergence among the EMU countries, we do see a bigger 
effect for EMU countries. This rudimentary dif-in-dif analysis suggests that increased co-movement is 
partly due to the monetary union. 
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3. Labour migration 
 
Mundell (1961), in his seminal work on currency unions, already pointed out the relevance of labour 
mobility for assessing the costs of entering into a currency union. Countries experiencing an adverse 
economic shock will suffer a decrease in employment. Without the possibility to devaluate the 
currency and in that way decrease relative wages, real wages will have to decrease to restore 
employment. This often proves difficult. Alternatively, if the economic shock was in particular to one 
country, those in search of a job may move to neighbouring countries. In that way, emigration can help 
restore full employment.
5
  
 
The level of migration among the EMU countries is lower than among states in the US. Gakova and 
Dijkstra (2008) in a paper for the EU, DG Regio, compare migration figures for 2006, for both US states 
and EU countries and regions. They find that US cross-state migration is roughly twice as large as 
cross-country migration in the EU. If one only considers the EMU, figures are even lower. 
 
Note that it is not only migration of EMU citizens themselves that matter. A significant part of EMU 
migration involves migration from other parts of the EU into the EMU (e.g. from Eastern Europe), or 
immigration from non-EU countries. Relative changes in employment prospects in various EMU 
countries can affect those migration flows. Ahearne et al (2009) focus on the impact of the economic 
crisis on East-West migration within Europe. In a case study on Ireland, they show that immigration 
flows from EU accession countries rose sharply during the boom years, to drop again significantly as 
the crisis hit. They conclude that migrants absorbed a more than proportional share in the Irish labour 
market adjustment.  
 
To see how responsive migration is to country unemployment levels, we have a look at the (net) 
immigration rates in a number of EU periphery countries. In Figure 3.1, we plot, for three countries, 
immigration rates (per thousand population), against relative unemployment. We define relative 
unemployment as the ratio of unemployment to average EU-15 unemployment. Hence, a value larger 
than one implies relatively high unemployment compared to EU-15, and low values correspond to 
years in which unemployment was relatively low. The data comes from Eurostat, and represents the 
years 1991-2011.  
 
                                                 
5
 A comment is that in the long-run emigration reduces the tax base and potentially leads to the departure of the most 
promising employees. 
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Figure 3.2: Net immigration versus relative unemployment, for three EU countries, 1991-2011 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
The negative regression lines indicate that total net immigration decreases with relative 
unemployment. Given the limited time frame of the data, most of the effect will be determined by the 
effect of the construction booms in the periphery countries after the adoption of the euro, and the 
economic downturns after 2007. 
 
To get a longer term picture of the impact of employment shocks on migration, Blanchard and Katz 
(1992) introduced an indirect method of measurement. Suppose a state is hit by a shock in 
employment (e.g., less demand for the products the state specialises in). In response to, say, a drop in 
total employment, three things can happen: some people may get unemployed, average participation 
(hours worked) may drop, or part of the working age population may leave the country. Blanchard and 
Katz used this basic observation to measure labour migration as the residue of changes in 
employment, unemployment rate and labour participation.  
 
We can illustrate the mechanism by using the example of Massachusetts from Krugman (2012). The 
US state of Massachusetts was hit by a severe economic downturn in the beginning of the nineties. 
employment, as well as unemployment rates both in the state and countrywide. We see that the shock 
in the beginning of the nineties decreased employment in Massachusetts, and led to an increase in 
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the relative unemployment rate in the state. Five years later, there had been a recovery, with 
unemployment again at a lower than average level. However, total employment (as a share of US 
employment) had permanently decreased in 1996 compared to the pre-crisis level. The conclusion 
must be that part of the working population had migrated out of the state during the crisis.  
 
Table 3.1: Massachusetts employment dynamics around its 1991 economic crisis 
 
Massachusetts share in 
US employment 
Massachusetts 
unemployment rate 
US unemployment rate 
1986: pre-crisis 2.70 4.0 7.0 
1991: crisis 2.48 8.8 6.8 
1996: post-crisis 2.43 4.6 5.4 
Source: Krugman, 2012. 
 
Decressin and Fatas (1995) applied the Blanchard-Katz methodology to the EU, based on data up to 
1987. As in Blanchard and Katz (1992), they measure the effects of an employment shock on 
subsequent employment levels, unemployment rates and participation rates. They focus on data on a 
regional level within the EU, including 51 regions, and study the time period up to 1987. Their main 
findings are that, in Europe, a larger share of employment shocks over their study period was met by 
changes in the labour participation rate. Migration played a smaller role in Europe than in the US.  
 
Only few studies have since tried to update the Decressin and Fatas (1995) analysis with more recent 
d 
Fatas, how labour mobility has evolved over time. When comparing with data up to 2005, she finds that 
the role of migration in EU countries has become stronger in more recent years.  
 
abour mobility in the EU has 
changed over time. In the next section, we therefore analyse labour market adjustment in response to 
asymmetric shocks using the methodologies of Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas 
(1995). In particular, we study how shocks to national labour demand in the EMU are absorbed by 
changes in national unemployment, labour force participation and migration, compared to the US. First, 
we investigate the co-movement of employment, the unemployment rate and the participation rate 
between countries in the EMU and between states in the US and the portion of the variance in country 
(state)-specific variable changes that cannot be accounted for by EMU (US) wide macroeconomic 
shocks. Next, we analyse the persistence of shocks in employment, unemployment and labour 
participation. In order to investigate labour market adjustment dynamics in response to shocks to 
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national labour demand, we analyze the joint behaviour of relative employment, relative 
unemployment and relative participation rates.  
 
3.1 Method 
 
We briefly describe the methodology of Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Decressin and Fatas (1995). 
The extent to which yearly changes in respectively employment, unemployment, and labour force 
participation rates are common to all countries in a particular monetary union (the level of co-
movement), is measured by estimating the following regressions for each country/state  in the EMU 
and the US: 
 
 (5) 
  (6) 
  (7) 
 
Here  denotes employment in country/state  and  stands for employment in the EMU (US);  
denotes the participation rate in country (state)  and  stands for the participation rate in the EMU 
(US);  stands for the unemployment rate in country (state) ; and  denotes the unemployment 
rate in the EMU (US).  
 
To examine the persistence of regional labour market shocks, we study how quickly employment, 
unemployment and participation in a region return to their mean once the country (state) has 
experienced a shock. We do this by measuring, for example, the response of national employment 
relative to total EMU employment as a result of an asymmetric shock to employment. For this analysis 
we need the portion of the variance in regional changes in employment, the unemployment rate and 
the participation rate which cannot be accounted for by the monetary union wide macroeconomic 
shocks. These country/state-specific variables are given by the residuals of regressions (5), (6) and 
(7).  
 
  (8) 
   (9) 
  (10) 
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 With these residuals we can estimate a univariate autoregressive adaptation process that describes 
the response to a shock for relative employment growth, relative unemployment and labour force 
participation with the following regressions: 
 
 (11) 
  (12) 
  (13) 
 
Here,  stands for the logarithm of employment in country/state  minus the -adjusted logarithm of 
employment in the EMU (US) and a constant ,  is the unemployment rate in country/state  minus 
the -adjusted unemployment rate in the EMU (US) and a constant , and  equals the logarithm of 
the participation rate in country/state  minus the -adjusted logarithm of the participation rate in the 
EMU (US) and a constant  (as defined in equations (8), (9) and (10)). 
 
In the last part of this analysis we analyse the joint behaviour of relative employment, relative 
unemployment rates and relative participation rates in response to labour demand shocks. This allows 
us to decompose the response to a drop in total employment into the part that is absorbed by a rise in 
the unemployment rate, the part absorbed by a drop in the participation rate, and the residual that is 
covered by interregional migration. For this purpose, we estimate the following VAR regressions for 
both the EMU and the US, between 1983 and 2012: 
 
 (14) 
 (15) 
 (16) 
 
Here, , and  are the country specific shocks to employment, unemployment rate and 
participation, defined as in (11), (12) and (13), and L represents the lag operator. We run pooled OLS 
estimation where we allow for 2 lags for each variable and allow for region-specific fixed effects.  
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3.2 Data 
 
Data on employment, unemployment rates and labour force participation rates for the EMU countries 
comes from the OECD Labour Force Survey. We generate a panel of 11 EMU countries
6
 with yearly data 
for the period 1983-2012. For the US we generate a panel of 51 states that is composed of yearly data 
on employment, unemployment rates and labour force participation rates from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and covers the period 1976-2012. Table 3.2 below shows some descriptive statistics of the 
data used. 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
Country Employment (x1000) Unemployment rate Participation rate 
  1983-2001 2002-2012 1983-
2001 
2002-
2012 
1983-
2001 
2002-
2012 
Belgium 3710 4322 9,1 7,8 61,4 66,9 
Finland 2325 2458 9,0 8,0 75,4 76,0 
France 22025 25255 10,6 8,8 68,2 70,4 
Germany 32516 37710 7,4 8,4 69,8 75,8 
Greece 3736 4310 8,7 11,7 62,0 68,0 
Ireland 1266 1932 12,8 8,1 63,7 71,7 
Italy 20880 22764 11,0 8,0 59,8 63,7 
Luxembourg 162 205 2,4 4,5 62,0 67,4 
Netherlands 6468 8183 7,6 4,2 67,4 77,9 
Portugal 4713 5048 5,7 8,9 74,3 78,1 
Spain 12980 18454 18,6 14,1 62,7 72,5 
EMU 110780 130641 10,3 9,1 65,9 71,5 
US 120851996 140887471 6,0 6,7 66,2 65,6 
Source: Bruegel, OECD Labour Force Survey and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 We exclude Austria because of a lack of data.  
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3.3 Results 
 
As is common in the literature, we look at the results of the estimation through the lens of impulse 
responses: if employment in one region is hit by an unanticipated shock, how does the labour market 
return to equilibrium? We consider the period 1983-2012, for both the EMU and the US. 
 
We first consider the univariate channels, equations (11), (12) and (13). Results of the estimations for 
all processes in both regions are presented in Tables 0.5, 0.6 and 0.7 in the Appendix. Let us focus 
here on the relative unemployment rate, equation (12). After a shock in relative unemployment, 
unemployment will gradually return to its equilibrium level. How fast does this occur and how do the 
US estimates compare with those in Europe? 
 
Plugging in the estimates of the time series regression, Table 0.6, we can plot the evolution of 
unemployment in response to an unanticipated shock in unemployment of 1 percent. The results are 
shown in Figure 3.2. 
  
Figure 3.2: Response of unemployment: EMU and US 1983-2012 
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Source: Bruegel, OECD Labour Force Survey and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
From Figure 3.2, we see that the same 1 percent initial shock to unemployment is resolved faster in 
the US than in the EMU. 
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 Next, we turn to the joint dynamics of employment, unemployment rates and participation rates. 
Again, we ask how these variables respond to a sudden deviation of employment in a single country 
from the joint trend. We investigate the dynamic response of these variables to a sudden 1 percent 
decline in relative employment. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the impulse responses for the EMU and the 
US, respectively. The graphs are derived from the results in Tables 0.8 and 0.9 in the Appendix.  
 
The short run responses to an identical employment shock in the EMU and the US are fairly similar. In 
the EMU, a 1 percent shock to the labour demand raises the country relative unemployment rate by 
0.16 percentage points and lowers the participation rate by 0.35 percentage points in the first year. So, 
within the first year of the shock, of every 100 workers that lose their job in the EMU, 16 workers 
become unemployed, 35 drop out of labour force and 49 workers migrate out of their country. In the 
US, a 1 percent shock to the labour demand raises the state relative unemployment rate by 0.17 
percentage points and lowers the participation rate by 0.42 percentage points in the first year. This 
means that of every 100 workers that lose their job in the US, 17 workers become unemployed, 42 
drop out of labour force and 41 workers migrate out of state within the first year. 
 
In the longer run, equilibrium is restored by a change in the size of the labour force: total employment 
is permanently affected. This effect is larger for the US, where the relative employment level gradually 
moves to a long-run value of around -1.44 percent, compared to -1.11 percent in the EMU. As 
unemployment and participation rates return to their equilibrium paths, the remaining change in 
relative employment is driven by workers migrating to more prosperous regions.  
 
The evolution of the response functions for the EMU and the US are distinct, but there is a marked 
difference with the original results of Decressin and Fatas. In that study, covering a period until 1987, 
changes in the participation were the major component in absorbing the shock. In contrast, in the US 
migration was much more important as an employment shock absorber in that period. In the present 
study, we see a much less pronounced role for participation rates in meeting shocks in Europe. 
Migration has become more important, and Europe has started to resemble the US more in this 
that remains, though, is that in the long run, the final effect of migration in the US remains higher than it 
is in Europe.  
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 Figure 3.3: Impulse response functions for the EMU 1983-2012 
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Source: Bruegel, OECD Labour Force Survey and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
Figure 3.4: Impulse response functions for the US 1983-2012 
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Source: Bruegel, OECD Labour Force Survey and Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
We study to what extent interregional migration contributes to the restoration of employment after an 
idiosyncratic shock. We compare the situation for states in the US and countries in the EU.  
 
The earlier literature (Blanchard and Katz, 1992, Decressin and Fatas, 1995) concluded that in the 
period up to the late 1980s, interstate migration was a far more important mechanism for labour 
market adjustment in the US than in the EU. In Europe, on the other hand, changes in labour 
participation were greater than in the US, with people reducing working hours or withdrawing from the 
labour market in adverse times.  
 
Subsequent analyses have indicated that migration has increased in importance in the EU since then, 
and our analysis corroborates that view. Looking at data up to 2012, we find that the US still see larger 
migration in response to employment shocks than Europe, but the gap has decreased in more recent 
years. 
 
Migration among EMU countries does not necessarily contribute most to the smoothing of employment 
shocks. Also migration flows from outside the EMU into the EMU countries tend to respond to changing 
conditions in these countries. Indeed, periphery countries that suffered large shocks in employment 
recently, see large declines in net immigration rates, even though net immigration remains positive. 
Changing employment conditions will therefore partly be absorbed by outsiders, moving either to 
other EMU countries or refraining from entering the EMU altogether. 
25
4. Capital market integration 
 
Financial integration provides a second channel of risk sharing among countries within a union. If 
assets within a country are partially owned by outsiders, private foreign parties or foreign governments 
bear part of the changes in values of those assets. In this way, changes in domestic consumption are 
partially decoupled from changes in domestic output. 
 
Cross-border asset ownership within the EMU has grown strongly since its creation. Figure 4.1 shows 
the evolution of intra-EMU cross-border holdings of equity and debt since 1997. Data comes from the 
IMF portfolio statistics. We see that in particular debt
7
, but also cross-border equity holdings among 
EMU countries have grown tremendously.  
 
Figure 4.1: Evolution of intra-EMU total cross-border holdings of equity and debt 
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s' calculations. 
 
Lane (2008) surveys the evidence that the institution of the monetary union itself has contributed to 
the development of more international debt and equity markets in the EU, including a stronger role for 
foreign direct investments. Such growth is not unique to the EMU, as global financial market integration 
has grown as well (see e.g. Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2010, who compare cross-country portfolio 
holdings within the EMU with other OECD countries). Nevertheless, growth has been even stronger in 
the EMU.  
                                                 
7
 Bijlsma and Zwart (2013) show that EU corporate bond markets have grown explosively since the early 2000s. 
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-border holdings. The line in 
-EU assets). Clearly, 
the growth and internationalisation of EMU banks has been a great contributor to sizes of cross-border 
equity and debt. As Sapir and Wolff (2013) point out, this has occurred mainly through the channel of 
interbank financing, and not so much through direct credit to consumers in other countries.  
 
Easier access to credit from foreign banks can help in smoothing consumption, through greater 
opportunities for saving and borrowing. If banks can more easily fund themselves on international 
capital markets, they do not need to rely only on domestic savings to provide domestic credit. This 
decoupling of domestic saving and borrowing demands allows firms and households to smooth 
temporary output shocks.  
 
Even if financial integration itself increases, we cannot automatically conclude that consumption 
shocks have attenuated as a result. Even leaving aside the risks of the sudden drying up of external 
debt financing
8
, investments in debt are less conducive to cushioning asset shocks than equity is. 
Equity is fully loss absorbing, while debt only suffers when cash flows dry up sufficiently to endanger 
debt servicing. In addition, although gross cross-border holdings increase, these may be accompanied 
by offsetting increases in liabilities, for instance if financial intermediaries finance their foreign credit 
by issuing foreign debt themselves.  
 
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2010) present some evidence that although consumption risk decreased 
in the direct aftermath of the euro introduction, this decrease in risk was not markedly different from 
non-EMU countries. The decrease in volatility in this period is of course well-known, as the Great 
Moderation (e.g., CPB, 2009). Lane (2008) provides some evidence that over longer periods, 
consumption risk sharing has not significantly increased as a result of the introduction of the euro.  
  
A systematic way of decomposing the channels through which GDP shocks feed through into 
consumption risk has been provided by Asdrubali et al (1996). They disentangle, for US states, how 
relative changes in GDP are reflected in changes in interstate capital positions, in (fiscal) transfers 
among regions, borrowing and saving, and in consumption itself. For the US, Asdrubali et al (1996) find 
                                                 
8
 The growth of external credit can also have adverse consequences, as has been highlighted in the recent crisis. The EMU 
crisis has been preceded by a huge build-up of credit to both private and public sectors (see e.g. Lane, 2012). For a large 
part this credit was invested in non-productive assets, as witnessed by the real estate booms in, e.g., Ireland and Spain. 
When adversity hits, the dependence on external debt exposes countries to sudden stops in refinancing, worsening rather 
-Ferretti and Tille, 2013), foreign creditors pulled back 
short term credit from financial intermediaries, inducing forced liquidations that had add-on effects on GDP for these 
countries. 
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a strong role for capital markets in cushioning individual state shocks: 40 percent of shocks are 
smoothed through capital markets, while credit markets (borrowing and saving) smooth another 
quarter of the shocks. Only a quarter of output shocks directly manifests itself in changes in 
consumption. 
 
Subsequent research has explored the model for other regions, including the EU and the EMU (see also 
IMF, 2013, for an overview of results for various regions). Afonso and Furceri (2008) look at the EMU up 
to 2005 and find that a much larger proportion (over 60 percent) of output shocks has gone 
unsmoothed. Capital markets play much less of a role in the EMU than in the US, although their 
importance in smoothing consumption shocks has increased in the later part of their sample. Balli and 
Sorensen (2007) find similar results for the period up to 2003. The higher fraction of unsmoothed 
shocks is mostly a result of the lower smoothing through credit markets, in particular due to lower pro-
cyclical saving by governments, rather than the private sector (Balli and Sorensen, 2007).  
 
Quite recent contributions to this literature are Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al 
(2014). These studies include the years up to 2010, for the EU and EMU. This means that these studies 
capture the start of the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. Both studies indicate that in these 
crisis years, smoothing decreased. In particular, the increase of capital market smoothing documented 
in earlier work is found to reverse in the latest years, with lower or even negative smoothing through 
these channels during the crisis.  
  
In the following, we carry out an analysis along these lines for the EMU, using data up to 2012. 
 
4.1 Method 
 
We decompose GDP into net national income (NI), disposable national income (DNI) and total private 
and public consumption (C+G). To quantify the amount of risk sharing among countries/states we 
distinguish three different channels through which smoothing of temporary shocks to GDP takes place. 
First, members of a country/state can share risk via cross-ownership of productive assets on capital 
markets (capital markets), which can be taken to equal the difference between GDP and NI. Second, 
the tax transfer system of the national government can further smooth income (fiscal transfers), which 
can be taken to equal the difference between NI and DNI. Third, consumption can be adjusted through 
lending and borrowing on credit markets (total saving), which can be taken to equal the difference 
between DNI and C+G. 
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We follow Asdrubali et al (1996) in decomposing country-specific shocks to GDP using the following 
 
 
 (17) 
 
Here, denotes the country/state and  
this shock can be absorbed in different ways. One possibility is that total consumption, C+G, drops by 
the same percentage. The output shock is then completely unsmoothed. Alternatively, the ratio of 
disposable income to consumption decreases, signifying that consumers smooth part of the shock by 
lowering their saving. If national income, NI, drops faster than disposable income, DNI, this implies a 
change in the proportion of fiscal transfers. The second factor on the right-hand side captures such 
changes. The first factor represents the capital market channel: if GDP drops but national income 
decreases by a lower proportion, part of the output shock will be borne by foreign owners of productive 
assets.  
 
To formalise these ideas, as in Asdrubali et al we take logs and first differences in (17) and multiply 
both sides by ΔlnGDP:  
 
var{ΔlnGDP}  =  cov {ΔlnGDP, ΔlnGDP - ΔlnNI} 
   + cov {ΔlnGDP, ΔlnNI - ΔlnDNI} 
   + cov {ΔlnGDP, ΔlnDNI - ΔlnC} 
   + cov {ΔlnGDP, ΔlnC}     (18) 
   
Each of these covariances measures one of the shock absorption channels mentioned above. To 
estimate them, we run the following panel regressions: 
 
    (19) 
 (20) 
 (21) 
  (22) 
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where  are time fixed-effects,  is the estimate that measures the fraction of the shock that is 
smoothed by capital markets,  is the amount smoothed by fiscal transfers,  is the part smoothed 
by consumption and finally,  is the fraction of the shock that remains unsmoothed. Of course, since 
the total output shocks should be reflected in the sum of all four components, we should have 
 
 (23) 
 
If  = 0 there is full risk-sharing and the coefficients sum up to 1. Moreover, the 
coefficients have no constraints which means that they can be either larger than 1 or negative if there 
is dis-smoothing. With time fixed effects we control for year-specific impacts on growth rates. 
Furthermore, we allow for autocorrelation in the residuals, as in Asdrubali et al (1996).  
 
4.2 Data 
 
Data for EMU countries are derived from the annual macro-economic database (AMECO). We generate a 
panel of 12 EMU countries with yearly data on income and other related aggregates for the period 
1972-2012. For income we use gross domestic product (GDP) expressed in 2005 euros. As a measure 
of net national income (NI) we use national income at current market prices, which is the difference 
between gross national income and consumption of fixed capital. For disposable national income 
(DNI) we use national disposable income at current market prices which equals gross national 
disposable income minus consumption of fixed capital. As an indicator for consumption we use total 
consumption at current prices, which is the sum of final private consumption expenditure and final 
general government consumption expenditure. We use a price deflator to convert all variables into 
2005 euros. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
Figure 4.2 gives an overview of the contribution of the different channels in the smoothing process for 
four different sub-periods in the EMU. For more detailed results see Table 0.10 in the Appendix. We find 
that the percentage of the shocks to GDP in the EMU that is not smoothed by the three channels is 
large and increases considerably over time, from 49 percent in the entire period 1972-2012 to 76 
percent in the crisis years 2008-2012. The only smoothing channel that is statistically significantly 
different from zero over the entire time period seems to be savings.  
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 Figure 4.2: Development income smoothing process EMU over time 
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Source: AMECO, author calculations. 
 
The part insured by this channel decreased until the start of the crisis, but savings became more 
important again during the crisis where they absorb around 39 percent of the shocks among EMU 
countries. Furthermore, the capital market channel does not significantly contribute to the absorption 
of shocks in the EMU, which could be explained by the high bias towards domestic assets (Wolff, 
2012) in the EU. It is apparent that the home bias has come down in recent years and that capital 
markets in the EMU have been given an increasingly important role until the crisis (in line with Balli and 
Sorensen, 2003). Since the crisis, however, the effect of the capital market channel has been dis-
smoothing. This is in line with recent research by Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013) (see also IMF, 2013a), 
who find negative smoothing in periods of financial crises of similar magnitude. Part of this dis-
smoothing is explained by the role of capital depreciation, which tends to be negative as depreciation 
itself does not immediately decrease when GDP does (see e.g. Kalemli-Ozcan, 2013). But also foreign 
factor income contributes negatively in this period, as Furceri and Zdzienicka (2013) show. Kalemli-
Ozcan et al (2014) look into this effect in more detail and demonstrate that the negative contributions 
occur mainly in 2010 (the last year in their panel), and in particular for the periphery countries. They 
explain the negative contribution in terms of increased interest payments on debt for these countries. 
Finally, the smoothing by fiscal transfers appears to have increased over the past decades but this 
effect is not statistically significant. 
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Figure 4.3: Comparison percentage of income smoothed by channel EMU and US 
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Source: AMECO, Asdrubali (1996), author calculations. 
 
From the literature we know that the different channels in the EMU and the US operate in a different 
way. This is confirmed in Figure 4.3, in which we compare our results for the EMU with the results in 
Asdrubali (1996) for the US
9
. While capital markets in the EMU only started to get a more important role 
over the past two decades, in the US they have played a significant part in the smoothing process for a 
much longer time. Also savings have a significant effect on income smoothing in the US, though the 
role of this channel is smaller than in the EMU and got less important during the 1980s, when there 
was a shift away from savings into capital markets. Finally, there is a difference in the operation of the 
fiscal transfers channel. While fiscal transfers smooth 14 till 16 percent of the income shocks in the 
US, there was federal government dis-smoothing in the 1970s and an insignificant effect in the 1980s 
in the EMU. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
We analysed the various channels of risk sharing among EMU countries, using the methodology of 
Asdrubali et al (1996). We estimated what fraction of GDP shocks remains unsmoothed, and hence 
translates directly into shocks in consumption, and what fractions are smoothed through cross-border 
ownership (capital market integration), fiscal transfers among countries, and credit markets. 
 
                                                 
9
 Because of a lack of data on consumption per state we have not updated the analysis on the US. 
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Judging by cross-border debt and equity ownership statistics, capital markets in the EMU have 
become much more integrated since the introduction of the euro. However, the role of this cross-
border ownership in insuring country-specific output shocks in the EMU is still weak compared to the 
US, where it is one of the most important channels of insurance. In fact, and consistent with other 
recent analyses, this role has again decreased during the recent crises.  
 
Among the different channels, only credit markets play a large role in smoothing output shocks, 
although the size of risk sharing through this channel has declined over time. Consequently, the 
fraction of shocks that goes unsmoothed in the EMU remains large compared to the US, and has 
increased over time. 
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5. Risk sharing through a common safety net for banks  
Since the financial crisis, EMU institutional arrangements have undergone drastic changes. Plans have 
-
in, national safety nets
10
 and as a backstop the possibility for indirect or direct recapitalisation by the 
ESM. The latter is a potential source of transfers between governments. 
In the US, an in some ways similar form of burden sharing exists in the form of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Company (FDIC), which covers all deposit accounts up to an amount of $250,000 per 
depositor, per insured bank. Figure 5.1 below shows the losses incurred by the FDIC and its 
predecessors since 1980. The total amount of estimated losses incurred by the FDIC in the period 
2007-2013 was $33.2 billion, while the total size of bank assets involved in FDIC restructuring 
amounted to $1,869 billion.  
Figure 5.4: FDIC losses since 1980 
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Source: FDIC, author calculations. 
 
Although it is instructive to compare the FDIC with the safety net created in the EMU, a number of 
caveats apply. The FDIC has immediate access to a $100 billion line of credit at the Treasury that, 
under federal law, can be expanded to $500 billion. In addition, the banking structure in the US is 
different from that in Europe. European banks are more locally oriented and hold more securities 
issued by their own governments than US banks (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012). 
                                                 
10
  The national resolution fund is part of the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD). 
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To assess the potential extent of burden sharing that results from the proposed safety net in case of a 
banking crisis, we use a simulation method that has the following inputs: a distribution of shocks that 
hits banks in case of a banking crisis, assumptions concerning the impact of a shock on a particular 
bank given its characteristics and assumptions concerning the institutional details of the setup of the 
safety net. We are not aware of any empirical literature that undertakes a similar analysis. One 
somewhat related study by Bénassy-Quéréy and Roussellet (2013) aims to include the costs of 
implicit liabilities due to the banking sector in an analysis of the sustainability of government finances 
by combining an estimate of the frequency of crises with an estimate of government exposure to bank 
liabilities. 
Our analysis is limited in several important ways. First, one could go much further in modeling each of 
the steps in our simulation. Literature on stress testing exists, that generates shocks by estimating, for 
example, VaR regressions with macro-economic variables over multiple countries, see e.g. IMF (2011). 
Also, one could go into much more detail in analyzing the impact of a shock given bank-specific 
characteristics and relate macroeconomic shocks to their impact on banks. This would require a much 
more detailed analysis using e.g. different risk factors, detailed estimates of the probability of default 
(PD) and loss given default (LGD) of the loans on bank balance sheets. One could also try to model the 
propagation of shocks from one bank to another, something we abstract from here.  
The second important caveat relates to the uncertainty that surrounds the exact design of inter-
country risk sharing through this mechanism. Creditor bail-in looks good on paper, but may not be 
credible if it triggers a run on a systemic bank or leads to contagion, even though some institutional 
features may enhance credibility.
11
 Also, funds from the ESM can only be obtained if a country enters a 
program, and if countries are unable to shoulder the costs of recapitalising banks themselves. The 
probability of countries being unable to shoulder the cost of recapitalisation is very difficult to assess. 
Third, bail-in of shareholders and creditors also results in risk sharing between countries to the extent 
that such financial titles are held by foreign financiers. As a result of bail-in, foreign private financiers of 
banks will share in the cost of banking failures. We do not analyze the amount of risk sharing resulting 
from this mechanism, as there is little information on the exact distribution of bank debt, while this 
distribution is also highly endogenous. 
Because of these limitations, we only take a very partial first step in quantifying the extent of risk 
sharing resulting from having a common safety net for banks. We implement a simple analysis, which 
we think can provide some indication as to the size of the numbers involved.  
                                                 
11
 Funds from the resolution fund are only available after 5% bail-in, while the BRRD prescribes that government support is 
only possible after bail-in of senior debt. 
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5.1 Method 
 
For the simulation of shocks received by banks, we use a simple parametric distribution for the shocks 
 all banks 
are hit by an idiosyncratic shock, i.e., the shocks different banks receive are uncorrelated. Second, all 
banks are hit by perfectly correlated shocks.  
 
In both cases the shocks are drawn from the same exponential distribution, which we calibrate to 
match that of the distribution of non-performing loan ratios in banking crises in OECD countries, as 
found in Laeven and Valencia (2012). The mean of the distribution is 12.8 percent with a standard 
deviation of 12.6 percent. We fit an exponential distribution to the empirical distribution of Laeven and 
losses, the non-performing loan ratio should be adjusted for loss given default. We use the estimate of 
Schuermann (2004) of the mean loss given default on senior secured debt in the US over 1970-2003, 
which was on the order of 50 percent. Thus, in our simulations, banks will receive on average a shock 
with a mean of 6.4 percent and a standard deviation of 6.3 percent. In our sample of banks, which 
includes roughly $26,450 billion of assets in total, this implies that we will study an expected shock to 
the banking system amounting to roughly $1,694 billion in losses. 
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 Figure 5.5: Histogram of the non-performing loan ratio during banking crises in OECD countries in 
the period 1970-2011 with exponential fit 
 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2012), author calculations. 
 
To assess the distribution of these losses over shareholders, debt holders, national resolution funds, 
national governments and the ESM, we adhere to the current Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) of the European Commission, which has the following characteristics.  
 
Writing down the claims of existing shareholders and creditors of the beneficiary institution will be the 
first solution in case of a shock. This includes an appropriate level of write-down or conversion of debt. 
-weighted capital falls below the required minimum after the shock, equity and debt 
holders will be required to contribute up to 8 percent of liabilities to restore equity to its minimum level. 
Next in line is the resolution fund
12
, with a contribution that is capped at 5 percent of a beneficiary 
-in of debtors up to and including senior debt holders has to 
take place. 
 
                                                 
12
 These national resolution funds will merge into the European resolution fund, part of the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM), over a period of ten years. 
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Member states also agreed on an operational framework for using the ESM as a fiscal backstop for 
banking resolution that can only be tapped into after these aforementioned forms of recapitalisation 
are insufficient.
13
 Direct recapitalisation by the ESM will only be possible if the sovereign concerned is 
in an ESM program. Also, the sovereign must provide co-financing according to the burden sharing 
scheme which has been agreed between the sovereign and the ESM, where the Member State 
contributes either via a capital injection to reach the legally required minimum CET1-ratio or via a part 
of the capital injection of the ESM when the minimum CET1-ratio has already been reached.
14
  
 
Given a negative shock to bank assets and the institutional characteristics described above, we will 
allocate losses in the following stylised way, where we assume that any capital shortfall will have to be 
replenished to the old level, and that this cannot be done through the capital market. 
 
-
l, we then write down subordinated debt.
15
 In 
case more capital is needed after that, we allocate 5 percent to the national resolution fund. If there is 
still a capital shortfall left, we write down the following liabilities: senior debt with a maturity of over one 
year, trading liabilities, and the category other liabilities, which often contains unsecured items that 
can potentially be bailed-in. The amount that remains is what is potentially liable for financing by other 
EU member states and is the number that we are interested in. 
 
-
debt. After that, we allocate 5 percent to the national resolution fund. If there is still a capital shortfall 
left, we write down 50 percent of the following liabilities: senior debt with a maturity of over one year, 
trading liabilities and the category other liabilities, which often contains unsecured items that can 
potentially be bailed-in. Again, the output of the simulation is the amount that still remains to be 
covered after these steps. 
 
                                                 
13
 ESM recap money will not be available before the BRRD and the revised Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive have been 
finalised. It will only be provided to systemically important banks that cannot raise private capital, but do have a viable plan 
for returning to health. 
14
 This burden-sharing scheme determines the contributions of the requesting ESM member and the ESM, respectively. The 
scheme has two parts. First, if the bank has insufficient equity to reach a Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 4.5 percent 
in a stress scenario, the requesting ESM member will be required to make a capital-injection to reach a CET1 ratio of 4.5 
percent before the ESM enters. Second, if this ratio is reached, the national government of the bank involved will be 
required to make a capital contribution alongside the ESM equal to 20 percent of the ESM contribution in the first two years 
after the entry into force of the instrument and to 10 percent in the years after that initial period.  
15
 The national resolution fund can in principle only step in after 8 percent of liabilities has been bailed in. This does not 
fully correspond to what we do here. However, we (1) do not see how it is possible to bail in only part of senior debt and (2) 
this only makes a difference in a small number of cases. 
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As we also consider either fully correlated or fully uncorrelated shocks, we have in total four scenarios. 
In all scenarios a sum will remain that has to be borne by the national government, or will be shared 
with the other member states. The extent to which this burden will be shared with the other member 
states depends on the ability of the national government to bear the additional burden. Therefore, we 
will not make statements as to how this remaining capital shortfall is distributed among the EMU 
countries. 
  
5.2 Data 
 
We use balance sheet data for the year 2011 and make the following selection of 16 countries - 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, German, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovenia.
16
 In addition, we select per country banks that are 
results in 133 banks in total. From the balance sheets of banks in our sample we use equity, the CET1-
ratio, and total liabilities. Table 5.1 on the next page shows per country: the number of banks in our 
sample, the average amount of equity in billions of USD, the leverage ratio, and the ratio to total assets 
of subordinated debt; trading liabilities; other liabilities; other deferred liabilities; senior debt with 
maturity greater than one year, and senior uncovered debt. We calculate risk-weighted assets by 
combining information on total equity, tier 1 regulatory capital ratio, and total assets. For some banks, 
tier 1 regulatory capital ratio is missing. We assign these banks the average tier 1 regulatory capital 
ratio in their country sample. 
 
                                                 
16
 Banks balance sheets will have changed since 2011. However, we expect these changes to be limited relative to total 
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Table 5.1: Balance sheet characteristics of banks in the sample 
CID N Av 
Bank 
Equity 
(bn $) 
Leverage 
Ratio 
Sub 
Debt 
Ratio 
Trading 
Liabilities 
Ratio 
Other 
Liabilities 
Other 
Deferred 
Liabities 
Senior 
Debt 
Maturity 
greater 
than 1 yr 
Senior 
Uncovered 
Deb to 
Assets 
AT 9 4,84  0,05  0,02  0,02  0,02  0,00  0,21  0,24  
BE 6 3,13  0,03  0,01  0,02  0,02  - 0,09  0,12  
CY 3 0,41  0,04  0,02  0,01  0,01  0,00  0,01  0,02  
DE 25 9,53  0,04  0,02  0,02  0,02  0,00  0,23  0,27  
EE 1 0,63  0,15  0,01  0,01  0,01  - - 0,03  
ES 19 11,11  0,06  0,02  0,01  0,01  - 0,12  0,15  
FI 4 4,15  0,05  0,02  0,04  0,04  - 0,16  0,24  
FR 12 19,22  0,04  0,01  0,11  0,11  0,00  0,23  0,46  
GR 5 0,58- 0,00- 0,03  0,06  0,09  0,00  0,17  0,33  
IE 6 7,34  0,07  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,00  0,12  0,14  
IT 14 10,70  0,07  0,03  0,02  0,02  - 0,28  0,32  
LU 6 1,38  0,12  0,02  0,01  0,01  0,00  0,07  0,09  
MT 2 0,42  0,07  0,02  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,04  
NL 8 11,53  0,03  0,01  0,02  0,02  - 0,31  0,34  
PT 6 3,04  0,05  0,01  0,02  0,02  0,00  0,11  0,15  
SI 4 0,50  0,07  0,02  0,01  0,01  - 0,19  0,20  
SK 3 1,04  0,10  0,02  0,01  0,01  0,00  0,09  0,10  
Source: author calculations. 
 
5.3 Results 
 
Here we present results per country of our simulation analysis, where we average over 1,000 
simulated banking crises.
17
 We consider two cases: idiosyncratic banking shocks (i.e., fully 
uncorrelated shocks) and pure EMU shocks (i.e., fully correlated shocks). First, we show how the 
expected costs of a banking crisis are distributed across countries and across equity holders, debtors, 
the national resolution fund and the national government and possibly the ESM. We only show the 
expected cost for a pure banking shock, because the type of the shock (pure banking or pure EMU) 
does not affect the average expected shock, while the effect on who bears what part of the total shock 
also turns out to be limited.  
 
In aggregate, when a banking crisis occurs, with these parameters and our exponential probability 
distribution of banking shocks, the remaining shock in the scenario with full bail-in and idiosyncratic 
banking shocks is $31.7 billion. The total shock to the banking system amounts to roughly $1,678 
billion. Table 5.2 below shows the remaining required contributions under the four scenarios, after 
various categories have been bailed-in.  
                                                 
17
 If a crisis arises roughly every twenty years, this corresponds to averaging over a very long time-period. 
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 Table 5.2: Remaining shock (billion dollars) 
 Full bail-in Partial bail-in 
Idiosyncratic banking shock 31.7 137.3 
Pure EMU shock 44.7 153.2 
Source: author calculations. 
 
For comparison, the losses borne by the FDIC in the period 2007-2013 amounted to $33.2 billion. 
Note, however, that the EU banking system is roughly 4.5 times the size of the US banking system in 
2011 (see Table B.17 in Bijlsma and Zwart, 2012), scaling FDIC losses by this amount results in 
$149.8 billion. This is of the same order of magnitude as the remaining losses under the partial bail-in 
with idiosyncratic bank-shocks or pure EMU shocks.  
 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 below show the distribution of the expected shock over the various categories. It is 
clear from this figure that equity holders will bear the largest burden under the proposed rules, while 
national resolution funds also contribute substantially. 
 
Figure 5.6: Fully uncorrelated (L) and fully correlated shock (R) - full bail-in 
 
Source: author calculations. 
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Figure 5.7: Fully uncorrelated (L) and fully correlated shock (R) - partial bail-in 
 
Source: author calculations. 
 
Simulations show that the correlation coefficients of the various components of the shock hardly 
affect the expected contribution through the resolution. This result arises because shocks are 
uncorrelated over time and diversification over time (i.e., between different simulations) has roughly 
the same effect as diversification over banks. What does change substantially upon changing 
correlations, however, is the shape and variance of the expected contribution. The two graphs in Figure 
5.5 below show the probability distribution for the two cases under consideration. Note the different 
scaling of the axes. In the case of a pure banking shock, we have fewer extremes but we get a positive 
contribution by the resolution fund more frequently. In the case of a pure EMU shock, positive 
contributions occur less frequently, but extremes are larger. 
 
Figure 5.8: Fully uncorrelated (L) and fully correlated shock (R) - full bail-in 
 
Source: author calculations. 
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Figure 5.9: Fully uncorrelated (L) and fully correlated shock (R) - partial bail-in 
   
Source: author calculations. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
 
We presented a simple simulation analysis of risk sharing through the banking union. An important 
caveat is that results depend on assumptions made with respect to the size and cross-bank cross-
country correlation of the shocks received by individual banks. We also do not include a potentially 
important source of risk sharing that results because bail-in of foreign shareholders and creditors. With 
this in mind, we draw the following conclusions. 
 
First, requiring private entities to carry more of the burden will reduce the risk borne by the taxpayer. In 
the current set-up of the banking union the private sector absorbs by far the largest part of shocks. This 
also implies that the risk borne by the taxpayer depends strongly on how credible bail-in is.  
 
Second, if bail-in is credible, the expected level of the remaining shock (the maximum potential 
amount of risk sharing) is relatively small, $31.7 billion to $44.7 billion for the EMU as a whole in an 
average crisis with full bail-in, depending on how correlated the shock is. This may sound like a lot, but 
amounts to roughly 0.2 percent of EU GDP. Also, governments will have to bear these costs themselves 
if they are able to, which will limit risk sharing. If liabilities that can potentially be bailed-in are only 
used up to 50 percent, for example because full bail-in is not always credible, the expected level of the 
remaining shock increases, and roughly equals the level of risk sharing in the US through FDIC.  
Finally and importantly, although on average the amount of sharing across countries is small, our 
simulations show there may be crises in which contributions are quite sizeable. The probability of this 
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happening depends strongly on how shocks are correlated. For example, in a pure EMU shock, the 
remaining shock may involve over $5,000 billion in roughly five out of one thousand crises. When 
shocks to banks are idiosyncratic, such extreme events never happen due to risk sharing. 
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6. Discussion  
 
When countries join a currency union, they give up independent monetary policy. This implies that 
those countries cannot use such monetary policy anymore to recover from country specific 
downturns. Instead, they have to find other channels to insure against such economic shocks. One 
channel of insurance involves risk sharing with partner countries in the currency union.  
 
We survey the evolution of risk sharing among countries within the EMU, and compare with earlier 
literature and with risk sharing among states in the US. We find that, although country specific shocks 
did decrease in the intermediate aftermath of the creation of the euro, since the financial crisis new 
divergence has emerged between business cycles in various regions in the EMU. Asymmetries of GDP 
shocks between US states and EU countries are of a similar magnitude, but asymmetries in inflation 
rates are wider among the EU countries. 
 
Countries can mitigate the impact of such economic downturns on consumption if their labour force 
can easily adjust to shocks by migrating to other, more thriving countries. Another channel of 
insurance is provided by openness of capital markets, which makes economic shocks to be borne in 
part by foreign investors. And finally, shocks can be insured by other countries through explicit 
transfers. Fiscal cooperation in stabilising the banking system can be one example of such fiscal 
channels. 
 
Migration among EU countries has traditionally been a less important channel than in the US. We find 
that the situation has improved since earlier studies, but levels of migration in response to labour 
market shocks are still less developed than in the US. 
 
Financial integration among euro-area countries has increased enormously since 2000. In part, this 
market. If we look at the effect of capital market integration on the sharing of risk, this appeared to 
improve over the first years after the euro, although it remained a much less important channel of 
insurance than in the US. Since the financial crisis, capital markets have not been effective at sharing 
risks among euro-area countries. 
 
The current movement towards the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in banking may not only 
transfer risk from tax-payers to private bank shareholders and debt holders, leading to cross-border 
insurance if these parties are non-domestic. It can also give rise to stronger fiscal insurance among 
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countries. A preliminary analysis shows that in expectation the money flows among countries for bank 
restructuring will be modest. Depending on the correlations among bank crises, however, larger 
contributions may occur with low probability.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 0.1: Co-movement of individual euro-area countries with average EMU 
   Co-movement Y Co-movement of P Co-movement of C 
Country pre-euro euro Δ pre-euro  euro Δ pre-euro  euro Δ 
Austria 0.0116 0.0044 -0.0072 0.0070 0.0070 0.0000 0.0155 0.0084 -0.0071 
Belgium 0.0078 0.0044 -0.0035 0.0110 0.0045 -0.0065 0.0099 0.0068 -0.0031 
Finland 0.0210 0.0172 -0.0038 0.0092 0.0105 0.0012 0.0194 0.0143 -0.0052 
France 0.0069 0.0062 -0.0008 0.0067 0.0052 -0.0015 0.0085 0.0031 -0.0054 
Germany 0.0087 0.0103 0.0016 0.0070 0.0074 0.0004 0.0095 0.0125 0.0031 
Greece 0.0308 0.0323 0.0016 0.0238 0.0111 -0.0127 0.0206 0.0252 0.0045 
Ireland 0.0265 0.0194 -0.0071 0.0150 0.0277 0.0126 0.0317 0.0295 -0.0022 
Italy 0.0117 0.0048 -0.0069 0.0088 0.0126 0.0038 0.0127 0.0050 -0.0077 
Luxembourg 0.0286 0.0170 -0.0116 0.0110 0.0258 0.0148 0.0144 0.0134 -0.0010 
Netherlands 0.0123 0.0047 -0.0077 0.0074 0.0107 0.0032 0.0123 0.0117 -0.0006 
Portugal 0.0262 0.0122 -0.0140 0.0190 0.0093 -0.0097 0.0300 0.0126 -0.0174 
Spain 0.0134 0.0102 -0.0033 0.0102 0.0060 -0.0043 0.0123 0.0140 0.0017 
Source: World bank and Bureau of Economic Analysis, author calculations. 
* Pre-euro period is 1960-2001, euro period is 2002-2012. 
 
Table 0.2: Co-movement of individual states US with average US 
   Co-movement Y Co-movement of P Co-movement of C 
Country pre-euro euro Δ pre-euro  euro Δ pre-euro  euro Δ 
Alabama 0.0130 0.0064 -0.0065 0.0033 0.0022 -0.0010 0.0102 0.0085 -0.0017 
Alaska 0.0477 0.0436 -0.0041 0.0334 0.0611 0.0277 0.0400 0.0738 0.0337 
Arizona 0.0200 0.0225 0.0025 0.0053 0.0043 -0.0010 0.0111 0.0109 -0.0001 
Arkansas 0.0177 0.0052 -0.0125 0.0042 0.0036 -0.0007 0.0118 0.0080 -0.0038 
California 0.0153 0.0082 -0.0070 0.0026 0.0014 -0.0012 0.0114 0.0036 -0.0078 
Colorado 0.0102 0.0082 -0.0020 0.0018 0.0064 0.0046 0.0091 0.0063 -0.0029 
Connecticut 0.0165 0.0168 0.0002 0.0019 0.0054 0.0035 0.0107 0.0114 0.0007 
Delaware 0.0262 0.0268 0.0006 0.0100 0.0111 0.0012 0.0273 0.0171 -0.0102 
District of 
Columbia 0.0276 0.0152 -0.0124 0.0067 0.0063 -0.0004 0.0256 0.0236 -0.0021 
Florida 0.0073 0.0108 0.0035 0.0022 0.0046 0.0025 0.0101 0.0207 0.0106 
Georgia 0.0084 0.0093 0.0009 0.0032 0.0068 0.0036 0.0067 0.0128 0.0060 
Hawaii 0.0195 0.0061 -0.0134 0.0050 0.0041 -0.0009 0.0168 0.0115 -0.0052 
Idaho 0.0252 0.0198 -0.0055 0.0069 0.0072 0.0003 0.0119 0.0138 0.0019 
Illinois 0.0073 0.0056 -0.0017 0.0024 0.0052 0.0028 0.0092 0.0072 -0.0020 
Indiana 0.0146 0.0196 0.0050 0.0039 0.0076 0.0038 0.0074 0.0098 0.0025 
Iowa 0.0177 0.0144 -0.0033 0.0056 0.0085 0.0029 0.0177 0.0197 0.0020 
Kansas 0.0087 0.0179 0.0092 0.0039 0.0046 0.0007 0.0054 0.0212 0.0157 
Kentucky 0.0191 0.0119 -0.0072 0.0047 0.0076 0.0029 0.0077 0.0066 -0.0010 
Louisiana 0.0365 0.0255 -0.0110 0.0243 0.0403 0.0160 0.0329 0.0410 0.0082 
Maine 0.0053 0.0134 0.0082 0.0060 0.0065 0.0005 0.0087 0.0093 0.0006 
Maryland 0.0106 0.0097 -0.0010 0.0020 0.0044 0.0023 0.0072 0.0063 -0.0009 
Massachusetts 0.0139 0.0073 -0.0066 0.0023 0.0058 0.0035 0.0150 0.0047 -0.0103 
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Michigan 0.0210 0.0270 0.0060 0.0049 0.0110 0.0061 0.0121 0.0157 0.0035 
Minnesota 0.0111 0.0125 0.0015 0.0024 0.0041 0.0017 0.0110 0.0097 -0.0013 
Mississippi 0.0115 0.0145 0.0030 0.0040 0.0032 -0.0009 0.0128 0.0154 0.0027 
Missouri 0.0156 0.0104 -0.0052 0.0038 0.0069 0.0031 0.0097 0.0096 -0.0001 
Montana 0.0208 0.0073 -0.0135 0.0044 0.0085 0.0041 0.0194 0.0111 -0.0083 
Nebraska 0.0205 0.0178 -0.0027 0.0056 0.0095 0.0039 0.0129 0.0180 0.0051 
Nevada 0.0201 0.0262 0.0061 0.0070 0.0037 -0.0033 0.0124 0.0235 0.0111 
New 
Hampshire 0.0275 0.0058 -0.0217 0.0053 0.0074 0.0020 0.0269 0.0101 -0.0169 
New Jersey 0.0100 0.0081 -0.0019 0.0027 0.0039 0.0012 0.0087 0.0047 -0.0039 
New Mexico 0.0377 0.0248 -0.0129 0.0158 0.0175 0.0018 0.0261 0.0221 -0.0040 
New York 0.0127 0.0134 0.0007 0.0039 0.0027 -0.0012 0.0122 0.0116 -0.0006 
North Carolina 0.0121 0.0079 -0.0042 0.0064 0.0074 0.0010 0.0100 0.0100 0.0000 
North Dakota 0.0230 0.0373 0.0143 0.0077 0.0121 0.0043 0.0260 0.0541 0.0281 
Ohio 0.0132 0.0118 -0.0014 0.0028 0.0070 0.0041 0.0091 0.0045 -0.0047 
Oklahoma 0.0135 0.0203 0.0068 0.0074 0.0239 0.0165 0.0109 0.0199 0.0090 
Oregon 0.0281 0.0118 -0.0163 0.0055 0.0086 0.0030 0.0099 0.0086 -0.0012 
Pennsylvania 0.0075 0.0055 -0.0020 0.0033 0.0049 0.0016 0.0069 0.0033 -0.0037 
Rhode Island 0.0168 0.0097 -0.0071 0.0028 0.0040 0.0012 0.0157 0.0109 -0.0048 
South Carolina 0.0078 0.0072 -0.0007 0.0054 0.0089 0.0035 0.0088 0.0045 -0.0043 
South Dakota 0.0196 0.0303 0.0107 0.0076 0.0138 0.0062 0.0224 0.0342 0.0118 
Tennessee 0.0166 0.0105 -0.0062 0.0040 0.0089 0.0049 0.0095 0.0089 -0.0007 
Texas 0.0077 0.0178 0.0101 0.0103 0.0224 0.0121 0.0108 0.0157 0.0049 
Utah 0.0187 0.0109 -0.0078 0.0040 0.0046 0.0006 0.0087 0.0102 0.0015 
Vermont 0.0140 0.0158 0.0019 0.0021 0.0078 0.0057 0.0123 0.0112 -0.0011 
Virginia 0.0106 0.0108 0.0002 0.0051 0.0047 -0.0004 0.0097 0.0049 -0.0048 
Washington 0.0197 0.0149 -0.0047 0.0029 0.0039 0.0010 0.0083 0.0112 0.0029 
West Virginia 0.0184 0.0181 -0.0002 0.0047 0.0041 -0.0006 0.0097 0.0158 0.0061 
Wisconsin 0.0092 0.0059 -0.0033 0.0045 0.0082 0.0037 0.0076 0.0023 -0.0053 
Wyoming 0.0291 0.0393 0.0103 0.0240 0.0637 0.0397 0.0237 0.0299 0.0062 
Source: World bank and Bureau of Economic Analysis, author calculations. 
* Pre-euro period is 1987-2001, euro period is 2002-2012. 
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Table 0.3: Common labour market disturbances EMU 
Country 
Employment Unemployment rate Participation rate 
β St. error R² δ St. error R² ζ St. error R² 
Belgium 0.279* 0.123 0.159 0.710 0.209 0.291 1.085 0.063 0.915 
Finland 0.121* 0.269 0.008 1.331 0.503 0.200 0.005* 0.075 0.000 
France 0.238* 0.091 0.203 1.013 0.125 0.701 0.349* 0.036 0.775 
Germany 2.333* 0.271 0.733 -0.126* 0.243 0.010 1.082 0.048 0.947 
Greece 0.112* 0.282 0.006 0.693 0.517 0.061 1.023 0.079 0.857 
Ireland 0.593 0.344 0.099 2.461* 0.599 0.376 1.438* 0.102 0.876 
Italy 0.376* 0.104 0.326 0.968 0.204 0.446 0.703* 0.051 0.871 
Luxembourg 0.019* 0.191 0.000 -0.116* 0.184 0.014 0.980 0.058 0.910 
Netherlands 0.339* 0.246 0.066 1.049 0.473 0.149 2.066* 0.152 0.869 
Portugal 0.804 0.180 0.425 0.522 0.398 0.058 0.569* 0.061 0.756 
Spain 0.976 0.305 0.276 3.606* 0.330 0.810 1.775* 0.033 0.991 
Average 0.563 0.219 0.209 1.101 0.344 0.283 1.007 0.069 0.797 
Weighted 
average 0.996 0.200   1.325 0.500   0.979 0.053   
* Significantly different from 1 at 5%.    
 
Table 0.4: Common labour market disturbances US 
State 
Employment Unemployment rate Participation rate 
β 
St. 
error R² δ St. error R² ζ 
St. 
error R² 
Alabama 1.358* 0.130 0.803 1.276* 0.127 0.784 1.763* 0.141 0.849 
Alaska 0.474* 0.174 0.215 0.483* 0.130 0.332 0.836 0.186 0.420 
Arizona 1.317 0.195 0.629 1.030 0.076 0.869 0.955 0.146 0.603 
Arkansas 0.849 0.150 0.544 0.739* 0.106 0.634 1.142 0.165 0.630 
California 1.285 0.142 0.751 1.208 0.109 0.813 0.718 0.148 0.457 
Colorado 0.900 0.234 0.354 0.904 0.102 0.737 0.697 0.198 0.307 
Connecticut 0.516* 0.109 0.453 0.909 0.131 0.631 0.258* 0.232 0.042 
Delaware 1.277* 0.110 0.833 0.887 0.069 0.854 1.909* 0.275 0.632 
District of Columbia 0.756 0.376 0.130 0.785 0.111 0.641 -0.406* 0.318 0.055 
Florida 1.601* 0.105 0.896 1.189* 0.087 0.871 1.065 0.157 0.620 
Georgia 1.459* 0.077 0.930 1.024 0.088 0.827 1.352* 0.124 0.809 
Hawaii 0.674 0.167 0.375 0.494* 0.131 0.336 1.342 0.230 0.550 
Idaho 0.967 0.197 0.473 0.846 0.094 0.745 1.568* 0.144 0.810 
Illinois 1.191 0.113 0.804 1.183* 0.060 0.933 1.015 0.117 0.728 
Indiana 1.374* 0.124 0.819 1.301* 0.088 0.887 1.836* 0.122 0.889 
Iowa 0.536* 0.174 0.260 0.749* 0.105 0.646 1.572* 0.265 0.558 
Kansas 0.427* 0.085 0.482 0.495* 0.053 0.756 0.850 0.150 0.533 
Kentucky 0.697* 0.078 0.745 1.075 0.093 0.826 0.410* 0.085 0.457 
Louisiana 0.474* 0.197 0.177 0.760 0.242 0.260 0.458* 0.148 0.254 
Maine 0.979 0.127 0.686 0.799* 0.079 0.786 1.209 0.155 0.685 
Maryland 0.823 0.087 0.766 0.734* 0.059 0.846 0.928 0.104 0.740 
Massachusetts 0.939 0.115 0.711 0.799 0.141 0.533 0.731* 0.108 0.622 
Michigan 1.743* 0.112 0.900 1.580* 0.133 0.834 1.944* 0.178 0.811 
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Minnesota 0.644* 0.102 0.598 0.784* 0.060 0.861 1.258 0.136 0.754 
Mississippi 0.803 0.138 0.557 1.045 0.147 0.643 1.111 0.167 0.611 
Missouri 0.977 0.102 0.775 0.975 0.061 0.902 1.904* 0.136 0.876 
Montana 0.825 0.127 0.611 0.559* 0.118 0.444 1.029 0.164 0.583 
Nebraska 0.464* 0.112 0.391 0.410* 0.078 0.499 1.256 0.326 0.347 
Nevada 1.264 0.208 0.578 1.523* 0.126 0.840 0.173* 0.364 0.008 
New Hampshire 1.208 0.140 0.734 0.603* 0.127 0.446 0.827 0.127 0.603 
New Jersey 0.973 0.106 0.756 0.974 0.108 0.746 0.524* 0.105 0.469 
New Mexico 0.982 0.106 0.762 0.605* 0.133 0.424 1.175 0.160 0.658 
New York 0.896 0.096 0.763 0.771* 0.081 0.762 0.703 0.160 0.407 
North Carolina 1.231* 0.081 0.896 1.176 0.120 0.774 1.099 0.219 0.473 
North Dakota 0.348* 0.182 0.119 0.316* 0.093 0.292 0.646 0.390 0.089 
Ohio 0.974 0.049 0.935 1.148 0.090 0.854 0.993 0.135 0.659 
Oklahoma 0.407* 0.114 0.319 0.670* 0.116 0.545 0.330* 0.118 0.220 
Oregon 0.994 0.119 0.722 1.046 0.093 0.819 1.241 0.144 0.727 
Pennsylvania 0.815 0.094 0.734 0.994 0.080 0.847 0.884 0.266 0.282 
Rhode Island 1.120 0.190 0.564 1.191 0.172 0.631 0.139* 0.170 0.023 
South Carolina 1.076 0.164 0.614 1.142 0.111 0.792 1.288 0.319 0.368 
South Dakota 0.525* 0.118 0.423 0.416* 0.044 0.761 1.104 0.283 0.352 
Tennessee 1.169 0.134 0.739 1.163* 0.079 0.886 1.149 0.158 0.653 
Texas 0.391* 0.092 0.401 0.605* 0.095 0.591 0.699 0.201 0.302 
Utah 1.096 0.203 0.520 0.869 0.092 0.760 1.594* 0.125 0.853 
Vermont 0.821 0.112 0.666 0.643* 0.069 0.758 0.696* 0.105 0.610 
Virginia 0.751 0.130 0.553 0.773* 0.042 0.923 0.369* 0.163 0.154 
Washington 1.026 0.186 0.530 0.996 0.073 0.871 1.317* 0.134 0.776 
West Virginia 0.768* 0.086 0.749 1.211 0.303 0.364 1.205 0.331 0.321 
Wisconsin 0.867 0.117 0.669 0.990 0.087 0.822 1.808* 0.173 0.797 
Wyoming 0.240* 0.212 0.045 0.609* 0.141 0.400 0.340* 0.169 0.127 
Average 0.907 0.137 0.597 0.891 0.105 0.699 1.000 0.183 0.513 
Weighted average  1.010 0.119   0.991 0.097   0.985 0.166   
* Significantly different from 1 at 5%. 
  
Table 0.5: Regional relative employment growth 
Δn(it) Δn(it-1)   Δn(it-2) 
EMU (11 countries) 0.415  0.075 
 (0.060)  (0.062) 
US (51 states) 0.445  -0.064 
 (0.027)  (0.027) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Table 0.6: Regional relative unemployment 
u(it) u(it-1)   u(it-2) 
EMU (11 countries) 1.463  -0.574 
 (0.054)  (0.055) 
US (51 states) 1.1  -0.287 
 (0.026)  (0.025) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Table 0.7: Regional relative participation 
p(it) p(it-1)   p(it-2) 
EMU (11 countries) 0.889  -0.147 
 (0.058)  (0.056) 
US (51 states) 1.022  -0.205 
 (0.026)  (0.026) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Table 0.8: Univariate model of relative employment growth, unemployment rates and participation 
rates EMU 
Coefficient 
Δ Employment Employment rate Participation rate 
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Δn(it)     -0.158 0.026 0.345 0.025 
Δn(it-1) 0.495 0.085 0.089 0.036 -0.118 0.035 
Δn(it-2) 0.114 0.060        
u(it)           
u(it-1) -0.424 0.135 1.384 0.060 0.073 0.058 
u(it-2) 0.298 0.135 -0.497 0.059 -0.113 0.057 
p(it)           
p(it-1) -0.741 0.147 -0.077 0.065 1.014 0.063 
p(it-2) 0.333 0.145 0.081 0.060 -0.189 0.058 
 
Table 0.9: Univariate model of relative employment growth, unemployment rates and participation 
rates US 
Coefficient 
Δ Employment Employment rate Participation rate 
Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error Coefficient St. error 
Δn(it)     -0.171 0.012 0.417 0.019 
Δn(it-1) 0.454 0.036 0.081 0.016 -0.110 0.025 
Δn(it-2) -0.027 0.028        
u(it)           
u(it-1) -0.241 0.064 1.079 0.028 -0.150 0.045 
u(it-2) 0.002 0.061 -0.283 0.027 0.017 0.043 
p(it)           
p(it-1) -0.206 0.042 -0.102 0.019 1.040 0.029 
p(it-2) 0.090 0.040 0.074 0.018 -0.190 0.028 
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 Table 0.10: GLS estimates of income and consumption smoothing EMU 
  1972-2012 1992-2012 2002-2007 2008-2012 
Capital Markets (βc) 0.028 0.034 0.04 -0.294** 
 (0.67) (0.48) (0.22) (1.67) 
Fiscal Transfers (βf) 0.004 0.025 0.125 0.158 
 (0.13) (0.44) (0.94) -0.82 
Saving (βs) 0.481*** 0.364*** 0.332*** 0.387*** 
 (11.18) (6.19) (2.80) (4.34) 
Not Smoothed (βu) 0.487*** 0.617*** 0.532*** 0.763*** 
  (12.13) (11.91) (4.81) (7.79) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **,*** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
 
Table 0.11: GLS estimates of income and consumption smoothing VS, Asdrubali et al (1996) 
  1964-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 
βc 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.48*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
βf 0.05*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
βs 0.37*** 0.45*** 0.19** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
βu 0.3*** 0.06 0.19*** 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*, **,*** - statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
Table 0.12: ESM contribution key 
Country  ESM Contribution Key 
Germany 0.271464 
Finland 0.017974 
France 0.203859 
Ireland 0.015922 
Italy 0.179137 
Slovakia 0.00824 
Spain 0.119037 
Slovenia 0.004276 
Netherlands 0.05717 
Luxembourg 0.002504 
Belgium 0.034771 
Cyprus 0.001962 
Greece 0.028167 
Estonia 0.00186 
Austria 0.027834 
Malta 0.000731 
Portugal 0.025092 
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